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F OR NEARLY AS LONG AS HUMANS HAVE ENGAGED in organized violence, there have been attempts to fashion normative architectures 
to constrain and limit it. Such architectures-labeled the law of armed conflict 
in late, twentieth, century parlance-are the product of a symbiotic 
relationship between law and war. At times, man, fearful that warfare is 
evolving in a negative direction, acts proactively through law to forestall 
possible deleterious consequences. Thus, for example, many States, including 
the United States, have agreed to ban the use of blinding lasers in advance of 
any military force fielding them.1 Much more frequently, however, law has 
proven reactive.2 Indeed, in the twentieth century, codification efforts have 
followed major wars in almost lock,step fashion.3 
As the global community enters the next millennium, it is a propitious 
moment to consider how this symbiosis between war and the law of armed 
conflict will continue to evolve. That is the purpose of this essay. It begins by 
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asking what warfare might look like in the century. This prognosis 
provides the foundation on which to offer suggestions as to how law might 
respond to future war. 
Two obstacles stand in the way of any predictive endeavor along these lines. 
First, it quickly becomes apparent that there are myriad reasonable alternative 
futures, for the universe of variables is vast. Who are likely to be the core 
adversaries of the next century? How technologically advanced will these 
notional opponents be, and what might they target? What types of conflict will 
dominate the future? Will States generally fight alone, or cooperatively under a 
umbrella organizations such as the UN, NATO, WEU, or even the European 
Union? How will economic, political, ethical, and social forces affect weapons 
development and acquisition? 
The second obstacle is more basic. Even assuming arguendo that a "best" 
guess can be discerned among potential futures, history, as Arthur Schlesinger 
has noted, "teaches us that the future is full of surprises and outwits all our 
certitude.,,4 Who, for example, watching the Wright brothers' Flyer in 1903 
would have predicted that air power would dominate 
warfare or that reconnaissance would be conducted from objects 
circling the earth?s 
Despite the fog obscuring the future, the search for its correct trajectory is a 
necessary exercise in our efforts to affect it positively. This essay acknowledges 
the uncertainty involved but evades its full force by focusing on a particular 
alternative future, what will be called here Bellum Americanum-American 
war, the view of future war and warfare most prevalent in U.S. military circles. 
Use of the model should be judged neither xenophobic nor ethnocentric. 
Rather, it was selected because its vision is, in a relative sense, developmentally 
mature. Moreover, as the construct of a military 
wielding significant influence over how even combined operations6 are 
executed, the U.S. approach will likely exhibit determinative influence over 
warfare's evolution for the foreseeable future. 
After describing Bellum Americanum at some length, the essay turns to the 
"stressors" it presents for the current law of armed conflict. The term 
"stressors" is used to suggest that law evolves as it is stressed by changing 
circumstances. Much as water seeks a constant level, law inevitably moves to 
fill normative lacunae. Correspondingly, law loses its normative valence when 
it no longer serves "community"-a relative concept-ends. Thus, law is 
contextual and directional. It is contextual in the sense that it is understood 
and applied based upon the specific social, economic, political, and military 
milieu in which it operates. It is directional, for it is characterized by distinct 
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vectors; its generation or demise is rarely spontaneous or random. Cognizant of 
the suspect character of any predictive effort, then, this essay will describe and 
analyze how the context of a notional future, Bellum Americanum, might affect 
law substantively and directionally. Of course, only time can validate the 
approach. 
The U.S. Vision of the Twenty,First,Century 
Political,Military Environmene 
In the U.S. vision of the twenty,first,century world, the gap between rich 
and poor States-between "have" and "have nots"-will continue to grow. 
This chasm will result in great part from the ability of developed States to 
leverage their comparative economic and technological advantages. At the 
same time, global economic interdependence will increase due to specialization 
in production by individual countries or blocs thereof. That interdependence 
may play itself out in the form of regional trading blocs, possibly dominated by a 
single State. As might be expected, State-centrism will continue to weaken in 
the face of the growing influence of intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations, multinational corporations, and even terrorist groups and 
international criminal syndicates. 
Within the developed world, increased economic well,being and wider 
diffusion of advanced technology will give a greater number of States the 
wherewithal to play a consequential role on the international scene. In 
particular, more States will be able to invest more in weapons acquisition. 
Economic and technical prowess will also allow additional States to develop an 
indigenous weapons production capability, a destabilizing trend that would 
likely lead to further proliferation of high, technology weapons.s 
On the other side of the chasm, the lesser and undeveloped countries will 
suffer from declining standards ofliving. Citizens of the disadvantaged States will 
be increasingly aware of their plight due to the pervasiveness of mass 
communications. The result will be, at least in some areas, unrest and instability, 
as the "have,nots" are sensitized to the gap between themselves and the "haves." 
Regional conflict is expected to remain the major threat to international 
peace and security,9 and there will be an increasing likelihood of asymmetrical 
challenges. Stymied by the relative dominance of the United States and its 
allies in conventional warfare, opponents, whether States or not, will consider 
such unconventional means as weapons of mass destruction, information 
warfare, and terrorism to strike less traditional centers of gravity. Many threats 
will be transnational in nature-such as international drug and weapons trade; 
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political, religious, or ethnic extremism; environmental damage-and the risk 
of "wild card" events, i.e., unanticipated occurrences that fundamentally 
change the international power scheme, will always be present. 
Security specific visions of the next century are the byproduct of these larger 
trends.10 Military power will continue to be a major determinant of national 
strength, though resort to force by developed States will most often be in 
collaboration with others. Proliferation of conventional weapons will be 
widespread, and the number of nuclear powers will grow. Military forces will 
continue to be called on to conduct humanitarian operations and deter the 
spread of regional conflict, as in the case of Bosnia. 
In the developed world, militaries will become smaller, compensating for 
their loss of personnel and equipment by leveraging technology to allow them 
to fight asymmetrically against larger forces.ll Lesser developed but upwardly 
mobile countries, particularly those which aspire to regional dominance, will 
retain large standing armies because of the symbolism of such forces. Terrorism 
will be a growing factor in military planning, particularly if terrorists acquire 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.12 
Warfare will become ever more driven by and dependent upon technology. 
Advances in micro technology, biotechnology, and information technology will 
radically transform the weapons of war and the way war is fought. So too will 
the growing dependence of the military on assets. As society and 
warfare evolve, the desired targets of war will also shift. The goal will still be to 
strike decisively at an enemy's center of gravity (or that of a target State or, in 
situations short of armed conflict, actor), but what constitutes a 
center of gravity in the future may radically differ from those with which 
warfighters are familiar todayY It is clear that the old paradigms of war and 
warfare are being broken as we enter the next millennium. 
The U.S. Response 
In order to deal effectively with this uncertain geopolitical environment, the 
United States has fashioned a national security strategy labeled "Engagement," 
the underlying premise of which is a rejection of isolationism in favor of the 
post-World War II global involvement in world affairs-illustrated by the 
Marshall Plan, NATO, the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, etc.-that is viewed as having won the Cold War.14 Because there are no 
adversaries, the military component of the strategy is capability, 
vice threat, based. IS The goal, one that will likely continue in rough form into the 
foreseeable future, is to "be able to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, 
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large,scale cross border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time 
frames, preferably in concert with regional allies."16 This capability to fight and 
win two major theater wars is complemented by the ability to conduct "multiple, 
concurrent smaller,scale contingency operations,"17 such as limited strikes, 
no,fly,zone enforcement, sanctions monitoring, or peacekeeping/enforcement 
operations. 
Operationally, these capabilities (and any others for which the need may 
surface) will be achieved through "full spectrum dominance," the ability to 
dominate warfare whether it occurs in space, the air, on land, or at sea, and 
regardless of the level of hostilities. "Joint Vision 2010" is the U.S. articulation 
of how this will be accomplished in the twenty,first century.1S It advances 
operational concepts, made possible through technological innovation and 
information superiority, that express how the United States will fight in the 
future. Three are particularly relevant to this essay. 
The first, "dominant maneuver," is "the multidimensional application of 
information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ 
widely dispersed joint air, land, sea and space forces."19 In the past, battlefields 
were generally linear-fielded forces faced each other across a geographically 
distinct line. In dominant maneuver warfare the battlefield is replaced by the 
battlespace, with force being applied from a wide variety of precision platforms, 
which are maneuvered in synchronization with other platforms to defeat a 
target pinpointed by superior information capabilities.2o 
"Precision engagement," the second operational concept, "will consist of a 
system of systems that enables [U.S.] forces to locate the objective or target, 
provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess 
our level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when 
required."21 The concept of precision implies more than precise weapons; it is 
the ability to achieve a desired effect on a specified objective.22 Key to the 
concept is a robust surveillance and reconnaissance capability and a collection 
of weapons systems that can generate just the right degree and kind of effect. 
Complementing precision engagement is "full,dimension protection," which 
will employ information technology to enhance the survivability of U.S. 
forces. 23 It is based on the truism that the easiest threat to deter is often a 
known one.24 
Conceptually, then, warfare as envisioned in "Joint Vision 2010" will be 
fast,paced, mobile, and highly lethal. An array of information gathering and 
processing assets will operate synergistically to generate greater situational 
awareness of the battles pace and provide the means necessary to shape it.25 If 
successful, the warfighter of tomorrow will be able to operate within the 
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enemy's decision cycle. This alternative future will cause new law to surface 
and highlight that which is no longer responsive to its context. 
The Revolution in Military Affairs 
The question du jour among those who focus on security issues is whether 
these operational concepts are being made possible by a "revolution in military 
affairs" (RMA).26 Revolutions in military affairs occur whenever the nature of 
war and warfare fundamentally changesY For instance, Napoleon's use of the 
citizen,soldier in the French army of the 1790s presaged war involving entire 
societies. A more recent RMA occurred ,vith the advent of nuclear weapons.28 In 
the then, existing bipolar world, offsetting nuclear arsenals led to war by proxy 
but deterred the major,power massive conflicts that had characterized 
inter,State conflict during the past century and a half. As in other RMAs, new 
weapons and defenses (e.g., nuclear mines and artillery, intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, and antiballistic missile systems) were fielded, and new operational 
concepts (e.g., limited nuclear options, extended deterrence, counterforce and 
countervalue targeting) were developed. 
When they occur, RMAs generate fundamental change in the normative 
architecture of war. For instance, the carnage that resulted from the clash of 
mass armies during the Napoleonic era motivated much of Hague law. Further, 
the sheer size of the resulting conflicts, and the fact that they now often 
occurred where civilians were, led to greater suffering by noncombatants; 
Geneva law resulted.29 So too ,vith the nuclear RMA. In the very short period 
since nuclear weapons have been in existence, and despite only two uses of 
atomic bombs, the global community has responded with treaties,30 attempts to 
articulate customary law,3! and judicial opinions.32 The causal relationship 
between RMAs and law is apparent. 
In the u.S. view, an RMA is well under way. The United States sees 
fundamental change in three areas: information operations, weapons systems, 
and space.33 This author would add a fourth arena of change, one derivative of 
the other three-militarization of civilians and of civilian activities. Bellum 
Americanum clearly envisions a leveraging of the advantages offered by this 
revolution. 
Information Systems.34 It would appear that Alvin and Heidi Toffler's "Third 
Wave" is upon US.35 Most agree that the key to the RMA of the twenty,first 
century will be information.36 Recognizing the importance of information in 
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warfare hardly represents a strategic epiphany; however, in the next century 
these capabilities will themselves be a key source of national power.37 
Many of the powerful information technologies are next generation 
improvements on current systems.38 For example, by the early part of the 
twenty,first century, satellites will offer worldwide coverage any time of day 
and with astonishing spatial resolution. The future may even include sound 
sensors powerful enough to allow a satellite to detect conversations on earth.39 
Advances in artificial intelligence will allow this data and that from other 
sensors to be fused, organized, and disseminated almost instantaneously. 
Even more fantastic are new technologies. Consider micromacruning. 
Scientists now believe that in the future they will be able to build robots, 
disguised as insects, that will have both optical and communications 
capabilities. Such systems could be used in areas where current systems are 
ineffective, like jungles with thick canopies. Some scientists believe that the 
sensors may one day approach the size of dust mites40 and be seedable by 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). More amazing still, micromacruned sensors 
may be able to taste and smell-useful senses when seeking out chemical 
weapons or finding objects made with a particular substance, such as the metal 
of military vehicles or aircraft.41 Of course, whether new or improved, sensor 
technologies are no panacea, a fact well illustrated by the futile attempt to 
destroy mobile Scuds during the Gulf WarY 
The ultimate benefit of information technologies is that they allow the 
warfighter to get inside his opponent's OODA-observe, orient, decide, 
act-loop and shape the battlespace before his adversary can. This represents a 
decisive advantage. For instance, in the noHoo,distant future the individual 
soldier will be equipped with the Land Warrior Modular Fighting System. Its 
components include a helmet,mounted computerized display tied to an 
improved weapon with a thermal sensor capable of night vision and an image 
enhancer for accuracy. The system will be capable of seeing around corners and 
over barriers, and of digitizing images for transmission up the chain of 
command. Soldiers of tomorrow will be able to view real, time "picture maps" 
on eye,sized video displays. Not unexpectedly, they will also be equipped with 
computers linked to others in their unit. The net result will inevitably be a 
more lethal soldier, and one able to operate more autonomously in the heat of 
battleY 
Similar enhancements will pervade other arenas of armed conflict. Combat 
aircraft will benefit from information gathered by sensors on other aircraft, as 
well as space and ground,based sensors and uninhabited reconnaissance aerial 
vehicles (URA V) .44 This will improve targeting precision, enhance 
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survivability, and reduce the possibility of fratricide. Shipboard information 
improvements may include the Force Threat Evaluation and Weapon 
Assignment System, being tested by Johns Hopkins University. The system will 
fuse data from all of a naval battle group's radars to create a three-dimensional 
display containing graphics, rather than symbology, of threats; it will then 
recommend which should be engaged and when.45 
At the operational (theater) and strategic levels of warfare, decision-making 
will be enhanced by the new ctISR technologies.46 Senior commanders will be 
able to literally watch the battle unfold. The transparency of one's opponents 
and the reliability and ease of communication with subordinate units will 
produce an unprecedented operational tempo. In particular, access to 
on-demand, real-time information will allow real-time planning, rather than 
the current practice of executing plans developed in advance of the 
engagement.47 
Lest information be considered a panacea, it must be recognized that the 
technology proponents of the new era herald may generate little more than 
additional Clausewitzian fog of war. For instance, microminiaturization will 
enhance stealth (that is, low-observable/masking technologies, or LOMT), as 
will active-radio-frequency and next-generation passive infrared capabilities.48 
Similarly, by the removal of their pilot and cockpit-producing "uninhabited 
combat aircraft vehicles" (UCA V)- aircraft can be designed with radar 
cross-sections reduced by a factor of two (or four against area-surveillance 
radars).49 A possible obstacle to transparency may be data overload-so much 
information that human decision-makers become overtasked and overstressed, 
and therefore make bad decisions.5o 
Finally, the availability of the systems may breed unhealthy dependencies 
-and vulnerabilities.51 Today the U.S. military alone has over 2.1 million 
computers and ten thousand local area networks.52 Given their importance, 
information systems will be key targets. Indeed, during the Gulf War they 
represented the lead target set for Coalition attacks.53 If forces become 
dependent on information resources, will they be able to operate in the event of 
disruption?54 Will information enable the forces of tomorrow ... or cripple 
them? 
Weapons Systems. The second change underlying the RMA is a quantum leap 
in weapons systems capabilities. It is an exaggerated continuation of a trend 
that has been underway for some time. For instance, through 1943 the U.S. 
Eighth Air Force attacked only fifty strategic targets in Germany. By contrast, 
in 1991 Coalition air assets struck 150 strategic targets on the first day of the 
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war alone.55 Improvements on this scale will continue into the twenty,first 
century; they can be grouped into two categories, weapons systems 
"intelligence" and weapons effect. 
Advances in the first category are previewed by today's precision guided 
munitions (PGMs), colloquially known as "smart" weapons. In the next 
century, weapons systems will be much more than smart-they will be 
"brilliant.,,56 The key is the concept of a weapon system. Twenty,first,century 
weaponry will draw information from a wide variety of sources (a system), not 
simply from the launcher or onboard sensors, to identify a target, strike it, and 
report results. To illustrate, consider an attack on a suspected biological 
weapons facility. Because of the risk that the attack could release biologicals, 
precision is essential. One Air Force study describes the type of information 
that would be gathered prior to such an attack: 
In the year 2025, sensor collection provides enough data for a virtual 3, D model 
of the [target) to include its composition, internal structure, baseline 
characteristics, and tendencies .... Sensors determine the building's exact 
dimensions and floor plan. They then highlight soft spots. Sensors distinguish 
between rooms containing biological agents, test equipment, sleeping quarters, 
and even the snack bar. Target acquisition sensors also construct a baseline, or 
living archive, of data concerning routine activity and environmental 
conditions. Examples include the average number of people who enter and exit 
each day, the number of vehicles in the parking lot, and the level of noise 
generated by the facility.57 
Using this information, mission planners can determine when the facility 
appears to be generating biologicals, where they are stored, and when it can be 
struck without causing high numbers of civilian casualties.58 To destroy the 
biologicals before they can be released into the atmosphere, a warhead will be 
used that will actually count walls as it penetrates them to ensure explosion in 
the proper room.59 
Systems not only will be more capable of determining where to strike, they 
will be better able to strike the exact point selected. With global positioning, 
inertial navigation, and other guidance systems, in the not,too,distant future 
accuracy will be measured in centimeters, not meters as it is today.60 Weapons 
systems will also be much smaller due to miniaturized munitions technology 
(MMT), thereby allowing more weapons to be carried.61 In the future, a single 
UCA V carrying brilliant weapons for release far from the target may have the 
same effect as a flight of manned aircraft that would today have to fight its way 
to the release point.62 
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The second fundamental change in weapons, that of effect, will abandon the 
approach of this century, whereby most weaponry destroys through 
penetration and explosive force. In the twenty,first century the continuum of 
effect will be multidimensional; explosives will predominate but be much more 
refined. For example, microtechnology will make possible micro explosives, 
mere grams of which can destroy targets.63 At the other end of the spectrum, 
nonlethal weapons (also known as "less lethal," inasmuch as they still have the 
capacity to kill) will increasingly be employed to limit collateral damage and 
incidental injury during armed conflict and provide commanders greater 
tactical flexibility during peace operations.64 
The variety of nonlethals being considered is impressive. Acoustic weapons 
can produce sound frequencies that disorient, cause pain, and bring on nausea. 
Microwave weapons will be able to induce seizures or simply bring on 
discomfort by raising the target's body temperature.6S There is even some 
discussion of sleep,inducing agents.66 Nonlethals can also incapacitate 
weapons and equipment. Electromagnetic,pulse weapons generate 
radio,frequency wavelengths that damage electrical components, usually 
without causing direct harm to humans.67 Supercaustics and liquid 
metal,embrittlement agents will attack surfaces, the former by corroding them 
(bridges, optical lenses, roads, tires, etc.), the latter by making them brittle and 
thereby liable to fracture in use. Both could be delivered by shell or sprayed 
from an aircraft.68 Microbes that eat rubber, silicon, electronics, and even oil 
have also been mentioned as possibilities.69 Seemingly more benign are 
"stick, urns" and "slick,ums." The first uses polymers that form a sticky foam 
capable of immobilizing humans without killing them; a variant is a "super 
glue" that can be dispensed from the air to foul weapons and equipment 
components. Slick,ums, by contrast, coat surfaces with an antitraction 
chemical that make them difficult to walk or drive upon.70 
Finally, given the reliance of future war on information systems, it is 
inevitable that weapons will be developed to attack them. Such traditional 
tactics as jammers or missiles that home in on specific electronic signals will 
continue to be refined. More revolutionary will be attacks on computer 
networks, sometimes called "hacker war." This form of warfare includes 
sending computer viruses into an adversary's computer system to destroy or 
alter data and programs. For example, "logic bombs" can be introduced that sit 
idle in a computer system, awaiting activation at the occurrence of a particular 
event or a set time; an air defense system logic bomb might be set to "explode" 
only when the missile launch sequence is initiated. Other techniques for 
disrupting an information system are as simple as flooding it with false 
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information, or using "sniffer" programs to collect access codes that allow entry 
into a target system.71 In some cases, such attacks may occur without revealing 
the source, or even the fact, of the attack. 
Space. The third defining aspect of the current RMA is the use of space. In 
much the same way that the airplane revolutionized twentieth,century warfare 
by opening a third medium from, through, and in which to fight, so too will 
access to space revolutionize warfare in the twenty,first. The value of space 
operations was illustrated dramatically during the Gulf War.72 By the 
twenty,first century, they will transform how war is fought, the lethality that 
can be brought to bear against military objectives, the degree and nature of 
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and civilian objects, and 
even where conflict will occur. Space, after all, is the ultimate high ground, 
that objective that militaries have sought since the first combat; the fact that it 
is a high ground ofinfinite depth renders it more valuable still.73 
Control of space, then, is an alluring prospect. The United States Space 
Command envisions space control-the ability to defend one's own space 
assets from space or ground,based threats while denying the use of space to an 
opponent.74 The reasoning is clear: 
[S)o important are space systems to military operations that it is unrealistic to 
imagine that they will never become military targets. Just as land dominance, sea 
control, and air superiority have become critical elements of current military 
strategy, space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield 
success and future warfare .... An increased dependence on space capabilities 
may lead to increased vulnerabilities. As space systems become lucrative military 
targets, there will be a critical need to control the medium to ensure U.S. 
dominance on future battlefields. Robust capabilities to ensure space superiority 
must be developed-just as they have been for land, sea, and air.75 
Should space control operations become a reality, the next logical step is 
force projection from space. Not surprisingly, the USAF Scientific Advisory 
Board is already discussing such possibilities as space,based lasers, or 
space,based mirrors to direct lasers on the ground.76 Space is clearly the next 
arena of warfare in the Bellum Americanum. 
Militarization of Civilians and Civilian Activities. The final factor 
revolutionizing warfare is a growing military dependency on civilians, and on 
civilian objects and activities. This continues a trend that began with 
Napoleonic warfare and the advent of the Industrial Revolution. By the time of 
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the Second World War, civilians and civilian objects were being attacked 
directly, reflecting their criticality to military forces. In the future, the 
relationship with civilians and civilian activities will be closer still. As 
drawdowns in military forces occur in the developed world, many of the 
activities traditionally performed by military personnel are being assumed by 
civilian contractors. For example, the U.S. military is contracting out aircraft 
maintenance, facilities maintenance, base security, transportation, 
communications, and the feeding and housing of troops. Increasingly, it is 
approaching a point where "member of the armed forces" will be synonymous 
with 
Moreover, as emphasis shifts to information operations, equipment becomes 
less identifiable as military in character. The push to purchase 
products in order to lower acquisition costs means that a device's character is a 
matter of the use to which it is put. Indeed, the bulk of information operations 
hardware and software comprises commercial products adapted to military use. 
As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens, 
has noted, 
Today, the center of technological acceleration in each of these technologies 
[battlespace awareness, C4I, and precision use of force) lies generally in the 
commercial, non-defense sectors. Our ability to accelerate the fielding of 
systems, on which we will base our future military superiority, thus depends on 
our capacity to tap into developments taking place for the most part outside the 
existing Department of Defense laboratory and development infrastructure.77 
Compounding the difficulty of distinguishing civilian from military is the 
fact that to keep costs low, many facilities-ranging from office buildings to 
airports-are shared by military and civilian operations. Such sharing is 
particularly likely with assets because of the cost of putting them in 
orbit. Thus, Space Command is actively seeking partnerships with commercial 
entities and consortiums, sometimes multinational in character, as well as with 
civilian agencies (e.g., NASA) involved in space operations. It also seeks links 
with foreign and international space operators, such as the European Space 
Agency.78 
The Legal Implications of Bellum Americanum 
As noted at the outset, the context in which law operates determines its 
content. Changing contexts cause stress to existing normative architectures, 
causing new law to emerge, or outdated and irrelevant law to fade away. The 
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remainder of this essay will shift from the predictive to the speculative, 
suggesting certain stressors found in Bellum Americanum and their possible 
effects on the current law of armed conflict.79 The catalog is neither exhaustive 
nor definitive, but merely the reflections of one writer on the possible 
implications of one alternative future. Moreover, the analysis is not an effort to 
suggest lexferenda. The goal is to posit probable normative vectors, rather than 
offer aspirational visions of the century. 
Jus ad Bellum. Bellum Americanum will stress the current jus ad bellum in a 
number of significant ways. Most fundamentally, the concept of war and 
peace--of the difference between an act that is merely unfriendly and one that 
is wrongful as a threat or use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter8o-will be strained. In particular, because information operations 
"attack" an adversary without actually employing force in the kinetic sense, 
they will raise serious questions about what constitutes "force."s1 Should the 
term include or hacker attacks on a 
country's banks, communications networks, or stock exchange? Does it make a 
difference if the operations are conducted to "prepare the battlefield" in 
anticipation of an actual conflict by, for instance, destroying military 
deployment plans and reserve force records, corrupting intelligence systems, or 
sending satellites off course? Similar stressors exist the Article 39 
threats to the peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression that empower the 
Security Council to authorize Chapter VII responses.S2 Moreover, the 
information era will challenge the concept of both under Article 
51 and the inherent right found in customary international law. Under what 
circumstances might a State be justified in responding with force to an 
information attack? Might such an attack constitute an "armed attack" under 
Article 51?83 When maya State use information operations in anticipation of 
an armed attack?s4 
Arguably, such stressors might move the jus ad bellum in the direction of a 
regime based on consequences, vice acts. In the current normative scheme, the 
consequences of an act are often less important than its nature. For instance, a 
devastating economic embargo is not a "use of force" or an "armed attack" 
justifying forcible even though the embargo may result in 
enormous suffering.s5 On the other hand, a relatively minor armed incursion 
across a border may constitute both a use of force and an armed attack.86 This 
contrary result derives from the law's use of "acts" as a cognitive shorthand for 
what really matters-consequences. Acts are more easily expressed (to "use 
force" versus to cause a certain quantum and quality of harm) and more easily 
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discerned than a standard based on effects, on the harm suffered. This 
synecdoche does not work well in the age of information operations because 
information attacks, . albeit potentially disastrous, may be physically 
imperceptible. Thus, as the nature of an hostile act becomes less determinative 
ofits consequences, current notions of "lawful" coercive behavior by States and 
the appropriate responses thereto are likely to evolve accordingly. 
Even beyond information warfare, the reality of military operations in the 
next century will stress existing distinctions between a premature use of 
"defensive" force and valid self,defense. In tomorrow's high,tech battle the 
first shot may be the last. As weapons become more lethal, the incentive to 
strike first grows, 87 and the threshold for preemption in self,defense on the basis 
of hostile intent drops precipitously.ss 
Bellum Americanum may also call into question jus in bellum participatory 
notions. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the rise of the 
nation,State, war has been the province, and until the turn of this century the 
prerogative, of States. When non,State actors have participated in organized 
violence, the normative paradigm has been that of international and domestic 
criminal law, not the law of armed conflict. Even the involvement of 
international organizations is a relatively new phenomenon. 
Yet if the U.S. vision is accurate, in the next century military forces will 
increasingly face non,State actors, ranging from terrorists to drug cartels. As 
that occurs, there will be growing pressure to articulate neoteric legal 
justifications for forceful responses. Consider Operation EL DORADO 
CANYON, the 1986 strike on targets in Libya in response to Libyan,supported 
terrorist attacks against Americans in Europe, including the La Belle Disco 
bombing in Berlin. Though justified at the time in terms of self,defense, it has 
been difficult to articulate the instant and overwhelmingS9 need to resort to 
force once those bombings had taken place.90 Or consider a hypothetical 
well,guarded drug laboratory in a remote region: under current international 
law, there is no legal basis for bombing the facility if more traditional law 
enforcement techniques fail. Or consider even a terrorist group that acquires 
biological weapons but is sheltered by a rogue State. Again, under present law 
there are no grounds for attacking the group until the point when it actually 
employs (or is about to employ) the weapons. If twenty,first,century national 
security threats are to come from non,State actors, then the law governing the 
resort to force is bound to evolve in a way that permits an effective defense 
against them. This will necessitate either blurring the State-non,State actor 
distinction or sharpening it by a new body of law governing actions against 
non,State actors. 
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The Jus in Bello Generally. In terms of the jus in bello, the differentiation 
between international and non,international conflict will continue to be 
strained.91 Bellum Americanum sees more Bosnias on the horizon, as ethnic and 
religious tensions remain divisive. The applicative difficulties posed by the 
conceptually "neat" distinction between international and non, international 
armed conflicts-Additional Protocol II and common Articles 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions versus Additional Protocol I and the Conventions in their 
entirety92-have been well illustrated in the seemingly contradictory 
conclusions regarding conflict status issued by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.93 The difficulty of fitting future conflicts 
into what William Fenrick has labeled the "two box" approach will create 
pressures to dissolve the distinction.94 Resistance to this pressure will come, of 
course, from States who jealously guard their autonomy. Thus, the natural 
tension between humanitarian concerns and sovereignty, a tension evidenced 
in such issues as humanitarian intervention, will worsen as attempts are made 
to determine which law applies to which twenty,first,century conflicts. 
Discrimination. Discrimination is a general principle of the law of armed 
conflict that requires an attacker to distinguish between civilians and civilian 
objects on one hand and military objectives (combatants or objects) on the 
other, and to use weapons capable of that discrimination.95 Paradoxically, 
despite vast improvement in weapons systems accuracy and battlespace 
transparency, complying with the principle may become increasingly difficult.96 
The problem is that the lines between lawful targets and protected objects will 
blur due to the growing dependency on civilians and civilian activities during 
military operations. 
The Additional Protocol I approach to ascertaining military objectives is 
relatively restrictive. Before an object may be deemed a legitimate target, it 
must "make an effective contribution to military action" and its destruction 
must offer the attacker a "definite military advantage.'197 Objects which make 
an effective contribution are those that are by nature beneficial to the military 
effort: weapons, aircraft, communications, etc. "Definite military advantage" 
refers to objects which contribute by virtue of their location (bridges, buildings 
used for shelter, etc.); such objects may not be attacked if only a "potential or 
indeterminate" advantage is anticipated.98 Civilians may not be attacked99 
unless taking "direct part in the hostilities."lOoThe International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary to the Protocol defines "direct" as "acts of 
war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the 
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personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces."lOl When doubt exists, a 
presumption of civilian status attaches. loz 
The degree of nexus between the object or individual to be attacked and 
military operations is already the subject of considerable debate. l03 The United 
States generally opposes any interpretation as restrictive as that propounded by 
the ICRC.l04 For instance, the U.S. Army has issued a legal opinion that 
civilians working at U.S. bases during an armed conflict 
would be appropriate targets of attack by the enemy.lOS Moreover, the most 
recent of the U.S. military manuals, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations, states that "[ e] conomic targets that indirectly but effectively 
support and sustain the enemy's capability may ... be attacked."lc6 
While this is not the place to resolve the debate, it is clear that a further 
blurring of the distinction can only increase pressures to render the standard 
less restrictive. By what logic, for example, would a civil engineer responsible 
for rapid runway repair at Base X be immune from direct attack when his 
military counterpart at Base Y would not be? An analogous dilemma is 
presented by objects. By current standards a munitions factory is a valid target. 
Given the essentiality of computers in warfare, would not 
a Microsoft plant also offer an military advantages that 
would merit a place for it on an air tasking order? Might the Internet itselfbe a 
lawful target? 
The operational principle of "dominant maneuver" set forth in "Joint Vision 
2010" is a further potential stressor for the principle of discrimination. As 
battle becomes virtual and nonlinear, as battlefields are transformed into 
battlespaces, military objectives and civilians and civilian objects will be 
increasingly intermingled. This diminishes the de facto protection formerly 
provided by distance from the forward edge of the battle area. While it is true 
that the maneuver warfare of, for example, the German blitzkrieg 
made it difficult to achieve this protection, the difference from prior warfare 
was quantitative, not qualitative-civilians could still flee the onslaught. 
Dominant maneuver generates a qualitative evolution because, at least in 
belligerent territory, there are far fewer places to which to flee, perhaps none. 
Similarly, in the past strategic bombing could be avoided by moving from the 
vicinity of strategic targets. In the century, by contrast, both the 
tactical and strategic fight may occupy the same space. Thus, civilians might 
move away from strategic targets (factories, storage facilities, etc.) only to find 
themselves in the midst of battle proper.l07 
This reality is likely to encourage strengthened obligations for precaution in 
attack, particularly target verification. lOS The information environment and 
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existence of brilliant weaponry will ease compliance, should this occur. One 
potential downside of the greater transparency of targets may well be that it 
encourages placement of military personnel and equipment near protected 
objects or persons in the hope that the other side will hesitate to attack lest 
harm befall them. The use by Saddam Hussein of civilians and cultural sites as 
shields is well knownj l09 indeed, since the conflict ended Iraqi civilians have 
flooded potential targets on numerous occasions to protect them in the face of 
threatened air attacks, against which the Iraqi military would likely prove 
impotent.lIo In much the same way that Iraqi use of these tactics should not be 
particularly surprising, given their weakness vis,8.,vis their opponents, the risk 
of similar practices in the notional asymmetrical battles of Bellum Americanum 
is especially high. 
Perhaps an even more ominous prospect is that transparency may place a 
premium on perfidious acts by potential targets.111 If I cannot hide, perhaps I 
can survive by appearing to the enemy to be other than what I am. In fact, the 
relaxation of the criteria for combatant status in the past decades is historical 
precedent supporting such a likelihood. Recall that under the Regulations 
annexed to Hague Convention IV, combatants were members of the regular 
armed forces (or formal militia), were commanded by a person responsible for 
their conduct, wore a fixed distinctive emblem (or uniform), carried their 
weapons openly, and conducted operations in accordance with the law of 
war.112 The 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War extended this status 
to members of an organized resistance movement which otherwise complied 
with the Hague IV requirements. l13 This change was one of status, not acts. 
Thus, for example, Josip Broz Tito's guerrillas would have fallen within the 
definition. 
As the nature of warfare evolved in the postwar period from primarily State 
on State to that of wars of national liberation and the like, many of the forces 
involved declined to distinguish themselves or carry weapons openly. The 
reason was quite practical. Facing a militarily superior force which occupied 
much of the territory in which they were operating, guerrilla fighters could not 
possibly make themselves so conspicuous and have any chance of successy4 
This fact was recognized in Additional Protocol 1's Article 44 exception for 
situations where "owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant 
cannot so distinguish himself." In such cases, a combatant need only carry his 
arms openly "during each military engagement" and "during such time as he is 
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding 
the launching of an attack."U5 Law responded to practicalities that rendered 
compliance difficult or dangerous for particular participants in the conflict. 
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The pervasiveness of surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in 
warfare can only serve to exacerbate this trend, as the 
disincentives against distinctive clothing, etc., swell for many combatants. In 
light of the technology that will be available, even revealing themselves briefly 
during or immediately preceding an attack will prove risky. How States react to 
this reality will be driven by their perspective on the humanitarian issues 
presented. But just as it is not surprising that States who might be expected to 
face guerrillas tended to oppose Article 44 while those that either had arisen 
from guerrilla movements or were unlikely ever to face one did not, States 
which enjoy a technological advantage can be expected to resist further 
erosion of the standard. Those which are technologically disadvantaged may 
not. 
A final aspect of the Bellum Americanum that may prove a stressor for 
discrimination is the use of nonlethal weapons. Nonlethals, while less deadly, 
tend to be less discriminatory. A slicbum will render a road treacherous for 
whoever passes down it, and an acoustic device is as likely to make a child 
playing nearby sick as it is to keep potential attackers away from a pedmeter. 
Interestingly, the use of nonlethals derives from a desire to foster 
proportionality in warfare-less precise weapons are employed in lieu of more 
lethal ones. Accordingly, there will be significant support for relaxing the 
demands of discrimination when it conflicts with efforts to enhance 
proportionality by limiting the quantum of collateral damage and incidental 
injury. 
Proportionality. Proportionality is the general principle in the law of armed 
conflict that prohibits means and methods of warfare that cause collateral 
damage to civilian objects, or incidental injury to civilians, disproportionate to 
the military advantage sought.116 The "Joint Vision 2010" operational concept 
of precision engagement enabled by information systems and brilliant 
weaponry is likely to push traditional proportionality calculations toward a 
point where immediately foreseeable collateral damage or incidental injury is 
unacceptable, at least when caused by a technologically advanced military.ll7 
In the century, the mere possibility of such damage may cause 
mission planners, or even individual soldiers, to shift to different weapons or 
tactics. 
Collateral damage and incidental injury have historically been the product 
of three factors: (1) lack offull knowledge as to what is being hit; (2) inability to 
meter the amount of force being applied to the targetj and (3) inability to 
ensure that a weapon strikes precisely the right point. With regard to the first, 
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consider the AVAmariyah bunker incident.us Some three hundred 
noncombatants were killed during the Persian Gulf War when U.S. aircraft, 
unaware that civilians had entered the Iraqi command and control bunker 
during the night, destroyed it. As to weapons availability and capability, 
extended gaps along the continuum of force remain. For instance, because 
nonlethals are absent from the inventory of most militaries, forces sent into a 
crowd, control or perimeter,defense situation have nothing to resort to 
between warnings or warning shots and the use of deadly force. Finally, in 
terms of accuracy-and despite the morbidly spectacular film of PGM strikes 
during the Persian Gulf War-the reality is that many weapons continue to 
lack fully reliable precision guidance. Today, for instance, fighter,bombers still 
"toss," "dive bomb," or simply drop the majority of their weapons, which in 
most cases are unguided, general,purpose bombs.ll9 
Each of these obstacles will eventually be overcome by technology. 
"Shooters" will be able to know what is they are hitting, and to hit it with a 
weapon that applies only the amount of force necessary to destroy or disable it. 
Accuracy will be nearly 100 percent. The commander, planner, and shooter 
will no longer have to carefully weigh expected collateral damage and 
incidental injury against the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated j 120 properly planned and executed, an attack should necessarily 
result in de minimus collateral damage or incidental injury. 
But civilian casualties will inevitably occur, and civilian objects will be 
damaged and destroyed-even in the twenty,first century. The evaluation of 
such results will tum on the exercise of "due care" in analyzing the target and 
selecting weapons and tactics. Of course, this standard is operative today in 
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I and in customary internationallaw.121 The 
difference in the future will be the complexity of the process, given the greater 
availability of target information, wider selection of weapons, and the 
discrimination difficulties noted above. The Al } Amariyah bunker provides a 
prototype of the concerns that will surround collateral damage and incidental 
injury. In that case the weapon selected was the GBU,28, a 
five,thousand,pound, laser,guided bomb able to penetrate twenty feet of 
concrete before exploding. It was just the right weapon to use, because though 
it would destroy the bunker, its laser guidance and the bunker's thick walls 
rendered collateral damage and incidental injury outside the bunker unlikely. 
The question, therefore, was not whether the ensuing deaths outweighed the 
military advantage gained in destroying this important Iraqi command and 
control facility, but whether the planners knew or should have known there were 
civilians therein. 
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Nonetheless, proportionality, as traditionally understood, will retain its 
utility in assessing reverberating effects, i.e., those effects not directly caused by 
the attack but rather by firsHier damage. The most often cited example is the 
attack on the Iraqi electrical grid during the GulfWar.122 That attack severely 
degraded Iraqi command, control, and air defenses; unfortunately, it also 
denied electricity to the civilian population, thereby affecting hospitals, 
refrigeration, emergency response capabilities, and so forth. This type of 
problem will only be exacerbated in the next century due to the 
interconnectedness of military and civilian functions. For instance, an attack 
on a satellite providing weather data necessary for flight operations may deny 
that information to agriculture, disaster relief operations, etc. Destruction of a 
satellite providing position data may likewise endanger civilian aircraft or ships 
by denying them essential navigational information. Shutting down a 
computer used to direct rail traffic, in an effort to disrupt the military logistic 
chain, may cause shortages of essential civilian goods. The spreading 
dependence on highly interconnected information and communications 
systems implies particular risks of reverberating effects during information 
warfare. These future realities will impel proportionality calculations towards a 
macro view of collateral damage and incidental injury.123 
Military Necessity. The full,spectrum dominance envisioned in Bellum 
Americanum will surely stress, in an unintended way, traditional understandings 
of military necessity.124 Under current norms, an actor must be able to 
articulate the imperative military advantage to be gained by an attack. "There 
must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property [or 
individuals] and the overcoming of the enemy forces."l25 The problem is that as 
one faces an opponent capable of military domination across the diverse 
spectrum of war, one inevitably considers asymmetrical attacks, possibly using 
unconventional means. 
The Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Israeli population centers were 
portentously archetypal. In no way did the attacks contribute to directly 
overcoming Iraq's enemies; Israel was not even involved in the conflict. Yet the 
apparent randomness of the attacks disguised a clever attempt to fragment the 
coalition by drawing in the Israelis and thereby putting Arab Coalition 
members in the position of being supported by Israelis in an attack on fellow 
Arabs. Facing full,spectrum dominance, Saddam Hussein was seeking 
psychological means to weaken the forces facing him.1Z6 
History teaches that forces facing vastly superior opponents often resort to 
seemingly random acts of violence. As incidents ranging from the bombing of 
408 
Michael Schmitt 
the King David Hotel in Jerusalem to that of the Khobar Towers in Riyadh 
demonstrate, when frustrated in battle disadvantaged opponents often carry 
the fight beyond the fields of fire in order to rupture alliances, cause an enemy 
to lose the will to fight, or weaken public or international support for their 
adversary's war effort. If dominance becomes a reality, acts that 
would seem wanton or random-that is, not militarily necessary-are likely to 
be all that remain to the disadvantaged side. This may cause the concept of 
military necessity to slip over time, in much the same way that practicalities 
have caused a relaxation in the criteria for combatant status. 
Humanity. By contrast, Bellum Americanum exhibits stressors which may 
suggest a heightening of the standards of humanity, a concept initially 
expressed in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 in connection with 
prohibiting means of warfare that "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled 
men, or render their death inevitable."m The maturation of the principles of 
proportionality and necessity has subsumed much of humanity's original 
meaning; after all, to the extent suffering is useless it is militarily unnecessary 
and, because it offers no direct and concrete military advantage, 
disproportionate. What remains are ab initio prohibitions on methods and 
means of warfare that are not so much inhumane as inhuman. We intuitively 
recognize them as wrongful regardless of the context in which they occur. To 
some extent, they are acts which violate the "dictates of public conscience,"128 
acts that civilized people just do not do. 
There has been a clear trend in the direction of prohibiting weapons on the 
basis of humanity, most recently evidenced by the Chemical Weapons, 129 
Biological \Veapons,130 Conventional Weapons,131 and 
Mines132 conventions. There is little doubt that each of the prohibited weapons 
can be employed in specific scenarios so as to cause minimal suffering and little 
risk to civilians or civilian objects. The use of tear gas to protect a facility is 
more humane than firing a rifle. Similarly, Protocol IV of the Conventional 
\Veapons Convention forbids the use of permanently blinding lasers, thereby 
driving soldiers to the use oflethal force to protect themselves.133 The rationale 
for these and analogous cases is humanity. However much sense it might make 
in a particular context, civilized human beings do not blind or poison each 
other, and therefore such behavior is outlawed. 
Recall just some of the weapons imagined above for the 
century-acoustic weapons that induce vomiting, microwaves that cause the 
human body to heat up, and electromagnetic pulses that will cause an airplane 
to fall to the earth after its engines shut down. Such weapons may be humane in 
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certain circumstances, but there is little doubt that many individuals will react 
to them viscerally as inhuman. Given the current trend in 
conventions, we can expect many of these weapons to be targeted for 
prohibition, regardless of their military necessity or the possibilities they offer 
for proportionate use. 
Treaty Regimes. War as envisioned in Bellum Americanum will stress a number 
of treaty regimes. For instance, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention 
prohibits the development, stockpile, acquisition, or retention of "microbial or 
other biological agents, or toxins in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes" and of "weapons, 
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict."134 By this standard, the use of microbes capable 
of "eating" rubber, silicon, electronics, or oil is likely to be forbidden. Similarly, 
the 1972 Chemical \Y/ eapons Convention prohibits parties from developing, 
acquiring, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. Chemical weapons include 
toxic chemicals which through their "chemical action on life processes can 
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
animals."m Many supercaustics and metal embrittlement agents could 
certainly fall into this category, and there is little doubt that 
agents would. 
A particular challenge posed by Bellum Americanum is to the current legal 
regime of space. There are a number of conventions which limit military 
activities in space, the Outer Space Treaty having the widest scope.136 Article I 
of the treaty creates a res communis, res nullius area by providing that" [0] uter 
space ... shall be the province of all mankind ... [and] ... shall be free for 
exploration and use by all States." Article ill requires all activities in space be 
carried on "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security" and 
restricts use of the moon and other celestial bodies to "peaceful purposes."m 
These provisions would appear at odds with the conception of space 
operations set forth in "Joint Vision 2010" and by both the U.S. Space 
Command and the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. How, for 
example, does the operational concept of space control, which includes denial 
of the use of space to the enemy, comport with the Article I requirement that it 
be preserved for use by all States? How can concepts of force projection be 
squared with the reservation of space for peaceful purposes? Indeed, how can 
the centrality of space to the U.S. vision of warfare in the century 
be at all consistent with the treaty prohibitions? 
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In fact, the inconsistency is not as substantial as might at first glance appear. 
First, there is no prohibition on the placement of weapons in space, only upon 
weapons of mass destruction. Thus, whether or not their use is prohibited, their 
development and emplacement would not be. More fundamentally, whether or 
not the treaty would survive the outbreak of hostilities is the subject of vigorous 
debate. 
Under classical international law, treaties did not retain their.effect during 
armed conflict; war existed beyond the realm of international relations-
bellum omnium contra omnes. The more modem approach accepts the survival 
of certain legal relationship between opposing belligerents.138 Three schools of 
thought characterize this camp. The first maintains that whereas some legal 
relations survive, treaties do not. A second group argues that treaties survive 
armed conflict unless their existence is fundamentally contrary to the 
existence of conflict, as for example a collective defense treaty between two 
adversaries would be. The third approach, the "theory of differentiation," takes 
a iniddle ground, asking whether continued vitality of the treaty in" question is 
consistent with the larger context in which it operates (such as the existence of 
Parties not involved in the conflict).139 
This area oflaw remains unsettled, particularly when applied in the context 
of a multilateral treaty governing an entire dimension of the earth,space 
environment. Nevertheless, the fervor of the debate can only be exacerbated 
by Bellum Americanum's emphasis on space,based operations. As this occurs, 
calls to establish some degree of normative clarity are certain to be heard. 
Clarity will also surely be sought over the concept of the reservation of space 
for "peaceful purposes." There is a long,standing dispute over the latter term, 
with some arguing that peaceful purposes should be understood to be 
"nonmilitary," whereas others, including the United States, interpret it as 
meaning "nonaggressive.,,140 Any military activities conducted under a UN 
Chapter VII mandate, pursuant to the Article 51 right to individual or 
collective self,defense, or consistent with the inherent right of self,defense 
under customary international law' would by definition be nonaggressive. As 
some States begin to enjoy full,spectrum dominance grounded in great part on 
space,based assets, whereas others without the resources to exploit space are 
rendered vulnerable by their relative nonparticipation in the space regime, the 
peaceful,uses issue is likely to resurface as a major substantive point of 
international discord. 
Dissemination. In Bellum Americanum, the ability to direct lethal force is 
increasingly pushed down the chain of command. Individual soldiers, sailors, or 
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airmen of the twenty,first century will have far more information on which to 
base the decision to employ force than have their twentieth,century 
counterparts. Moreover, they will control a wider spectrum of force, capable of 
being applied with greater precision. Thus, they will be both more and less 
lethal, and operate more autonomously than ever before. This will drive a need 
for relatively complex training in the law of armed conflict at far lower levels. 
Future warfare will therefore move current law of armed conflict dissemination 
requirements toward reinforcement and strengthening, and it will increase the 
importance oflegal advisers.Hl 
Nonnative Relativism. As the gap between the military "haves" and "have 
nots" widens, there will be subtle stressors that encourage an interpretation of 
the law of armed conflict relative to the State to which it is applied. For 
instance, due to their high cost, not all States can afford the precision 
munitions that help foster discrimination and proportionality. State A, which 
cannot afford them, is not criticized when it drops an unguided bomb that 
causes incidental injuries that are proportional to the military advantage 
gained. However, when State B, which can afford PGMs, elects to employ an 
unguided bomb in lieu of a precision weapon, it must justify that decision as 
reasonable in the circumstances (e.g., preserving PGMs for other targets which 
present a greater risk of collateral damage and incidental injury). In abstracto, 
an identical standard is applied to both States-a requirement to minimize 
collateral damage and incidental injury. In practice, however, the developed 
State is held to a higher standard. 
In the high, technology war of the twenty,first century this reality will be 
exaggerated many,fold, as the gap between "haves" and "have nots" widens. If 
State A has limited sensor capabilities whereas State B's are robust, must State 
B reasonably exhaust those capabilities to ensure the target is what B believes it 
to be? Or will it only be held to the standard of care imposed on A? In all 
likelihood, the answer lies in the teleological underpinnings of the law of armed 
conflict. It is no longer a body oflaw designed to ensure a fair fight between two 
opponents; on battlefields of the twentieth and twenty,first centuries, the law 
of chivalry has been overtaken by humanitarian law. Today, the law of armed 
conflict is designed primarily to minimize suffering and prevent unnecessary 
destruction. This being so, belligerents are held to the standards to which they 
are capable of rising. The sole exceptions are absolute prohibitions, such as the 
direct targeting of civilians or the use of poison. 
This normative relativism may take on a new form in the next century. If the 
economic and technological gap widens as the alternative future set forth 
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above suggests it will, the move towards a capability,based humanitarian 
regime may play itself out in an obligation to field weapons that pose the least 
risk to protected persons and objects.142 Some may even argue that if a wealthy 
State has the economic wherewithal to arm its forces with precision weapons, it 
should be obligated to do so. Similarly, it may be argued that if it has access to 
nonlethal weapons, its forces must be armed with them so long as doing so is 
otherwise operationally sound. This subtle shift from dictating tactics to 
dictating public policy may well prove a by,product of the "haves-have nots" 
polarization of the twenty,first century. 
The polarization may also determine the position States take toward law of 
armed conflict codification efforts. For logical reasons, States likely to be the 
target of a particular mean or method of warfare are most likely to support its 
prohibition; those likely to use it will generally oppose its banning. Thus, for 
example, the United States opposes the Ottawa treaty on antipersonnel mines 
in part because it sees great utility for the weapon on the Korean Peninsula.143 
Similarly, the United States, which will remain the major space power into the 
next century, interprets the Outer Space Treaty quite liberally. Given the 
technological gap between militaries that will emerge in the twenty,first 
century, there are certain to be attempts to offset weaknesses through bans on 
weaponry and its use. Support for such efforts, whether motivated by genuine 
humanitarian concerns or a clear,eyed view of one's own military impotence, 
will be determined in great part by the extent to which a State enjoys the 
benefits of Bellum Americanum. 
Of course, one must always be careful of what one wishes for. The 
"haves,have nots" dichotomy is driven by war,fighting concerns; opposition to 
weaponry may not always be positive in terms ofhurnanitarian principles. After 
all, much of the weaponry on the drawing boards will effectively reduce 
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and civilian objects. States 
likely neither to use new weapons nor be the target thereof will, therefore, play 
a vital role as "honest,brokers" in maintaining the humanitarian raison d'etre of 
the law. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Only time will tell whether the alternative future that has here been labeled 
Bellum Americanum will be realized. To the extent that it is, law can be 
expected to respond reactively and proactively to it. The normative 
consequences, some of which have been suggested above, are likely to be 
momentous. Assessments of whether such changes are steps forward or 
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backwards will often depend on one's perspective-nationality, ethical and 
humanitarian values, economic station in life, etc. Nevertheless, regardless of 
the conclusions individual cognitive contexts lead us to, there are portents of 
danger on the horizon for humanitarian principles. The line between war and 
peace and between inter' and intra,State conflict may become dangerously 
vague. Discrimination is placed at risk by growing militarization of civilians and 
civilian activities. The widening gap between military "haves" and "have,nots" 
will encourage disadvantaged forces to fight asymmetrically in ways that stress, 
possibly even violate, current normative parameters. Finally, the risk of warfare 
extending into a new arena-space-is looming. 
In light of these risks and the fact that a revolution of military affairs is upon 
us, perhaps the international community should take an increasingly proactive 
approach to normative change. As new technologies in warfare are brought on 
line, the disincentives for the "haves" to abandon or limit them will be high, as 
will the incentives for the "have,nots" to defeat them through other than 
conventional means. In a world evolving as rapidly as today's, time is of the 
essence. Of course, this is not to suggest codification for the sake of 
codification. Some weapons and operational concepts foster humanitarian 
ends. The point is that the time to think clearly about twenty,first,century war 
and what can be done to shape it is now. 
In closing, it is worth noting that one objectively valid threat to a normative 
architecture which fosters world order in the twenty,first century is the 
seeming isolation of the acts of future warriors. The further removed they are 
from their acts of war, the more difficult it will be for them to retain the 
humanitarian spirit that underlies the law of armed conflict. It is one thing to 
push a button while flying through the sky surrounded only by clouds; it is quite 
another to watch a human being one has shot bleed to death. The latter act 
brings home much more vividly the moral significance of the authority to use 
deadly force that one has been entrusted with. As we enter the next 
millennium, we must not lose sight of the reality of armed conflict, a reality 
found only in the consequence of an act, not the act itself. 
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80. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4): U All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 
81. It would appear that the drafters of the Charter did not intend the term Uforce" to apply 
beyond armed force. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 106, 112 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994). 
82. Under Article 39 of Chapter VII, the Security Council determines whether a "threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" exists. When the Council finds one does, it 
may "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems 
necessary or desirable. " rd., art. 40. It may also direcdy impose "measures not involving the use of 
armed force," such as interrupting aerial "means of communication." rd., art. 41. When the 
Security Council determines that non-forceful measures would be or have proved inadequate, it 
may authorize the United Nations, regional organizations, or member States to use force under 
Article 42 to restore or maintain peace. Force includes "such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security ... [including) ... 
demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations." rd., art. 42. For a discussion of the terms "threat, breach, and aggression," see 
Jochen Frowein, Article 39, in Simma, supra note 81, 60S, 608-12. 
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 51: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed atrack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediatelyreported to the Security Council and shall not in anyway affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order tomaintain or restore international peace and security. 
For a discussion of "armed attack," see Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Simma, supra note 
81, at 661,668-51. Numerous international agreements and pronouncements have reaffirmed 
this right of self-defense since ratification of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Inter -American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (Rio Treaty); 
Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
422 
Michael Schmitt 
princ. I, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1971),9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970); North Adantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 
art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance, Oct. 10, 1955, art. 4, 219 U.N.T.S. 3 (\'Varsaw Pact Treaty). 
84. Anticipatory self-defense is self-defense which occurs immediately prior to the attack. 
The most widely accepted standard is that articulated by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
with regard to the Caroline incident. The Caroline incident involved a Canadian insurrection in 
1837. After being defeated, the insurgents retreated into the United States, where theyrecruited 
more insurgents and planned further operations. The Caroline was being used by the rebels. 
British troops crossed the border and destroyed the vessel by setting her afire and sending her 
over Niagara Falls. Britain justified the action on the grounds that the United States was not 
enforCing its laws along the frontier and that the action was a legitimate exercise of self-defense. 
\Vebster replied that self-defense was to "be confined to cases in which the necessity of that 
self-defense is instant, ovenvhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation." Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in JOHN 
BASSE1T MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 411, 412. Professor Yoram Dinstein 
adopts the terminology "interceptive" self-defense. It occurs after the other side has "committed 
itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way." He argues that interceptive 
self-defense is consistent with Article 51. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF 
DEFENCE 190 (2d ed. 1994). 
85. On economic sanctions, see Paul S. Szasz, The Law of Economic Sanctions, in this volume. 
86. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 103: "There appears 
now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting an 
armed attack. In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be 
understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, 
but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as it amounts to' (inter 
alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its substantial involvement therein." 
87. On this point, see generally Donald A. Daniel, The Evolution of Naval Power to the Year 
20ID, NAVAL WARCOLL. REv., Summer 1995, at 62. 
88. In order to act in self-defense, U.S. forces must face either a hostile act or a 
demonstration of hostile intent by an opponent. Hostile intent is defined as 
the threat of imminent use offorce by a foreign force or terrorist unit, or organization against 
the United States and US national interests, US forces, and in certain circumstances, US 
citizens, their property, US commercial assets, or other designated non-US forces, foreign 
nationals and their property. When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use 
proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means available to 
deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat. A 
determination that hostile intent exists and requires the use of proportional force in 
self-defense must be based on convincing evidence that an attack is imminent. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (ClCSI) 3121.02, Standing Rules of Engagement for 
United States Forces (1994), at GL-9. This is a classified document, but large portions, including 
this quote, are unclassified. 
89. "Instant and ovenvhelrning" is the Caroline standard. See supra note 84. 
90. Actually, the Administration's statements seemed to include justifications based on 
both anticipatory self-defense and retaliation. For example, in the President's national address 
on the subject, he initially appeared to use reprisal as the basis for the attack: "Several weeks ago 
in New Orleans, I warned Colonel Qadhafi we would hold his regime accountable for any new 
terrorist attacks launched against American citizens. More recendy, I made it clear we would 
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respond as soon as we determined conclusively who was responsible." He then offered a classic 
self-defense justification: "Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose 
behind the mission undertaken tonight-a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN 
Charter." President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation (Apr. 14, 1986), in DEP'T ST. BULL., 
June 1986, at 1-2. See also White House Statement, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 1. Much 
attention has been paid to the fact that the United States believed Libya was planning attacks on 
up to thirty U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide. loint News Conference by George Schultz, 
Secretary of State, and Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense (Apr. 14, 1986), in DEP'T ST. BULL., 
June 1986, at 3. 
91. The distinction between international and non-international armed conflict is not 
always clear. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, an agreement designed to 
govern the latter, describes non-international armed conflict as "armed conflicts ... which take 
place in the territory of a [patty to the Convention) between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
conttol over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 1 (1), U.N. 
Doc. N32/144, Annex II (1977), 16 LL.M. 1442 (1977), [hereinafter Protocol II). International 
armed conflict is that which arises between States (or other subjects of international law) . See, 
e.g., Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions: "The present Convention shall apply to all 
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the 
High Conttacting Parries, even if a state of war is not recognized by one of them." Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
I); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N. T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III); and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention IV]. Additional Protocol I, which supplements the Geneva Conventions 
with regard to international armed conflict, simply refers back to Common Article 2. Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, art. 1 (3), U.N. Doc. N321144, Annex I 
(1977), reprinted in 16 LL.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. In a somewhat controversial 
provision, Protocol I includes as international armed conflicts "armed conflicts in which peoples 
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and racist regimes in the exercise 
of their right of self-determination." Id., art. 1 (4). Note that "internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature" are not 
armed conflict, either international or non-international. Protocol II, supra, art. 1 (2). 
92. Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions is identical and provides basic protections 
for "persons taking no part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause." Geneva Conventions I, II, III, IV, supra note 91, art. 3. The remainder of those 
conventions address international armed conflicts. 
93. Compare Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdomovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, Oct. 7, 1997 (finding an international conflict vis-a.-vis the Bosnian Croats) with 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-t-T, Opinion and Judgment, May 7, 1997. For a 
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discussion of these cases, see Leslie C. Green, Erdemovic-Tadic-Dokmanovic: Jurisdiction and 
Early Practice of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author, forthcoming in LESLIE C. GREEN, FURTHER EsSAYS ON THE MODERN LAw OF WAR 
(Transnational Pub., 1998». 
94. See William J. Fenrick, The Development of the Law of Anned Conflict through the 
Jurisprudence of the Intemati07UII Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in this volume. 
95. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 48: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and civilian objects and military objectives and 
shall direct their operations only against military objectives." 
96. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 48. 
97. Id., art. 52(2). The term "object" includes combatants within its scope. COMMENTARY 
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949, at 635 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARY). Military advantage should be evaluated in terms of the entire 
campaign/war, not simply the advantage which accrues directly to the attacking force. On this 
point, see Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in Fleck, supra note 79, at 105. 
98. COMMENTARY, supra note 97, at 635-36. 
99. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 51(2). 
100. Id., art. 51 (3). 
101. COMMENTARY, supra note 97, at 619. 
102. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 50(1-2). 
103. For an argument directly opposing the ICRC's restrictive approach, see W. Hays Parks, 
Air \Var and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE L. REv. 1, 113-145 (1992). 
104. For a general unofficial compilation of the u.S. views on Protocol I by then State 
Department attorneys, see Abraham D. Sofaer, AGORA: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I 
to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1988); Michael 
J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Internati07UI1 Law 
to the 1977 Protocols Additi07UI1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. u. J. INT'L L.& POL'Y 419 
(1987). 
105. Letter from DAJA-IA to Counselor for Defense Research and Engineering 
(Economics), Embassy of the Federal RepUblic of Germany Oan. 22,1988), cited in Parks, supra 
note 103, at 134. 
106. U.S. NAVY/MARINE CORPS/COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP I-14M, MCWP 5-2.1, COMDTPUB P5800.7), 
para. 8.1.1 (1995). The manual labels this a "statement of customary law," citing General 
Counsel, Dep't of Defense, letter of Sept. 22, 1972, reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 123-24 (1973). 
The annotated version ofNWP I-14M specifically defers on the more conttoversial issue of 
"whether this rule permits attacks on war -sustaining cargo carried in neutral bottoms at sea, such 
as by Iraq on Iranian tankers carrying oil exported by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war." NWP 
I-14M, supra, Annotated Version (1997), at 8-3 n.1l. 
107. Parties to Protocol I are obligated to "endeavour to remove the civilian population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their conttol from the vicinity of military 
objectives." Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 58(a). However, even if a Party intentionally uses 
civilians as a shield, the attacker remains obligated to consider collateral damage and incidental 
injuries in their discrimination and proportionality calculations. Id., art. 51(7--8). 
108. The requirements for precautions are set forth in Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 57. 
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109. After attacking Kuwait, the Iraqis used Western and Kuwaiti hostages to shield their 
military sites from coalition air attacks. The non-Kuwaiti civilians were eventually released in 
December 1990 when the tactic resulted in near universal condemnation. CONDUCT OF THE 
PERSIAN GuLF WAR, supra note 53, at 607 Using a civilian or other protected person in such 
a manner is a violation of Geneva Convention N and Protocol I and constitutes a Grave Breach. 
Geneva Convention N, supra note 91, artS. 29 & 149; Protocol I, supra note 91, arts. 75(2) (c) & 
85(2). Other examples included the dispersal of helicopters to residential areas, placing 
surface-to-air missiles in a school in a populated area of Kuwait City, and placement of fighter 
aircraft next to the Temple ofUr. CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, supra, at 613-15. 
11 O. Even if a Party intentionally uses civilians as a shield, a specific violation of Protocol I, 
the attacking party remains obligated to consider collateral damage and incidental injuries in 
their discrimination and proportionality calculations. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 51 (7-8). 
111. Perfidy consists of "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe 
that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the tules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence." Protocol I, supra note 91, 
art. 37. In addition to Protocol I, perfidy is forbidden in the Hague N Annexed Regulations. 
Hague Convention N Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annexed 
Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23 (F), 36 Stat. 2227, 1 Bevans 631. 
112. Hague Convention N, supra note 111, art. 1. 
113. Geneva Convention N, supra note 91, art. 4A(2). 
114. The requirement that combatants distinguish themselves from non-combatants 
through use ofa distinctive emblem dates back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874. Project on an 
International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, reprinted in Schindler & 
Toman, supra note 2, at 25. \Vith regard to Protocol I, according to the Rapporteur, the 
"exception recognized that situations could occur in occupied territory and in wars of national 
liberation in which a guerrilla fighter could not distinguish himself throughout his military 
operations and still retain any chance of success." XV Official Records of the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1974, at 453, CDDHJ407/Rev.1, para. 19. 
115. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 44(3). The United States opposes this provision on the 
ground that it will place civilians at greater risk by making it harder for military personnel to 
distinguish them from lawful combatants. 1 U.S. AIR FORCE, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL, OPERATIONS LAW DEPLOYMENTDESKBOOK (n.d.), tab 12, para. 1.7.6.1. Thus, by 
the U.S. view, those who fail to comply with the reqUirements of Hague become illegal 
combatants who can be targeted and, if determined to be illegal combatants by an appropriate 
Tribunal, tried and punished. NWP I-14M, supra note 106, para. 12.7.1 (1995). 
116. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 51 (5) (b) defines it as "an attack which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated." A similar prohibition is found in the Article 57 requirements for precautions in 
attack. Id., art. 57 (2) (a) (iii) & 57 (2) (b). On proportionality generally, see WilliamJ. Fenrick, The 
Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional War/are, 98 MIL. L. REv. 91 (1982); Judith G. 
Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM.]. IN1"L L. 391 (1993). 
117. The targeting policy of the Coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War was clearly 
moving in this direction. For instance, only PGMs were used against targets in downtown 
Baghdad, to avoid collateral damage and incidental injury. CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF 
WAR, supra note 53, at 97-98. 
118. Described in id. at 615. 
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119. For a description of current aerial weaponry and their employment techniques, see 
Robert A. Coe & Michael N. Schmitt, Fighter Ops for Shoe Clerks, 42 AIR FORCE 1. REV. 49 
(1997). 
120. Protocol I, supra note 91, arts. 51(5) (b), 57(2) (b). 
121. For instance, Article 57 requires "those who plan or decide upon an attack" to "do 
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian 
objects and are not subject to special protection" and to "take all feasible precautions in the 
choices of means and methods of attack (emphasis added)." Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 
57 (2) (i-H). The ICRC Commentary imposes a fairly demanding standard: 
[T)he identification of the objective, particularly when it is located at a great distance, 
should be carried out with great care. Admittedly, those who plan or decide upon such an 
attack will base their decision on information given them, and they cannot be expected to 
have personal knowledge of the objective to be attacked and of its exact nature. However, 
this does not detract from their responsibility, and in case of doubt, even if there is only a 
slight doubt, they must call for additional information and ifneed be give orders for further 
reconnaissance .... The evaluation of the information obtained must include a serious 
check ofits accuracy [emphasis added). 
COMMENTARY, supra note 97, at 680-81. 
122. For an a'{cellent discussion of attacks on electrical grids, see James \Y!. Crawford, The 
law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems, FLETCHER 
FORUM OF WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall1997, at 101. For criticism of the air campaign's effect on 
the civilian population, see Roger Normand & Chris afJochnick, The Legitimation of Violence: A 
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARVARD J. INT'L 1. 387, 399-402 (1994); William M. 
Arkin, The Environmental Threat of Military Operations, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
IN ARMED CONFLICT 116 (Richard J. Grunawalt et al. eds, 1996). 
123. Paradoxically, reverberating effects may enhance the deterrent or compellant effect of 
an action, for the greater the impact, the more likely a target State's decision-making will be 
affected. 
124. On the subject of necessity generally, see H. McCoubrey, The Nature of the Modern 
Doctrine of Military Necessity, 30 REVUE DE DROIT MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 216 
(1991); DE MULINEN, supra note 29, at 82--84. 
125. Hostages (U.S. v. List), 11 T.W.C. 759, 1248-54 (1950). 
126. For an argument that the Coalition violated the principle of necessity, see Normand & 
afJochnick, supra note 122, at 402-409. 
127. Declaration ofSt. Petersburg, 1868, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 2, at 
101. The principle is also expressed in Protocol I: "Itis prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles 
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering." Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 35(2). 
128. This phrase is drawn from the Martens Clause. Found in Hague N, it provides: 
Until a more complete code of laws has been issued, the high Contracting Parties deem it 
expedient to declare that, in cases:not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the 
inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the,rule of principles of the 
laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from 
the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience. 
Hague IV, supra note Ill, pmbl. A similar provision is found in Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 1 (2). 
129. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, U.N. Doc. 
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993). 
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130. Biological \Veapons Convention, supra note 1. 
131. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious Or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7, reprinted in 191.L.M. 1523 (1980). 
132. Geneva Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Cenain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious Or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices (protocol II), 19 I.L.M. 1529 (1980), as amended on May 3, 
1996,35 I.L.M. 1209 (1996). In 1997 antipersonnel mines were banned completely (for Parties) 
in the Ottawa Treaty on Personnel Mines. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 
18, 1997, available online at ICRC website, supra note 3. The Convention is not yet in force. 
133. Protocol N, supra note 1. Extensive discussion of the laser and mines issues can be 
found at the ICRC's homepage website. <http://www.icrc.org!unicc!icrcnews.nsfJDoclndex/ 
home _ eng?OpenDocument>. 
134. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 1, art. 1. 
135. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 129, an. 2. 
136. On military activities in space, see Peter Jankowitsch, Legal Aspects of Military Space 
Activities, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 143 (NandasiriJasentuliyana ed., 1992); 
Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communications Satellites: A New Look at the 
Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes," 60 J. AIRL. & COM. 237 (1994); Colleen Sullivan, 
The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: An Emerging Principle of International Law, 4 TEMP. 
INT'L & COMPo L.J. 211 (1990). 
13 7 . Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploitation and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan, 27, 1967, am. I & III, 18 
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 61.L.M. 386 (1967). 
138. This was the position taken by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in Techt v. Hughes: 
"international law to-day does not preserve treaties or annul them, regardless of the effects 
produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving or annulling as the necessities of 
war exact. It establishes standards, but it does not fetter itself with rules." 128 N.E. 185, 191 
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920). 
139. For a brief discussion of the approaches, see Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An 
Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1997). 
140. NWP 1-14 Annotated, supra note 106, at 2-38, n.I14. 
141. The requirementto train military personnel in the law of armed conflict is found in many 
instruments. See, e.g., Hague N, supra note 111, art. 1; Geneva Convention I, supra note 91, art. 
47; Geneva Convention II, supra note 91, art. 48; Geneva Convention III, supra note 91, art. 127; 
Geneva convention N, supra note 91, art. 144; Protocol I, supra note 91, am. 83 & 87; Protocol II, 
supra note 91, art. 19; Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 131, art. 6. On the role of 
legal advisers, see LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAw OF WAR, ch. 4 (1985). 
142. Since the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military has invested heavily in smart weapons. 
For example, the two U.S. carriers deployed to the Persian Gulf during the February 1998 crisis 
carried with them more sman weapons than all six of the carriers deployed during the war. 
Bradley Graham, New Weapons Give Navy Top Air Role This Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1998, 
at 1, 25. 
143. U.S. policy on this issue is described in White House Fact Sheet, U.S. Efforts to Address 
the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Sept. 17, 1997, available online at 
<htrp:!!www.state.gov!www!global/arms!index.htrnl>. 
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